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1. Introduction 
 
Environmental judicial review is characterised by the fact that much of its content is 
based on complex scientific assessments made by the administrative authorities while they, 
for example, estimate the environmental impacts of planned projects and consider the permit 
conditions. Controversies are often born out of disagreements on a certain technical or 
scientific assessment made by the authorities, which, in turn results—in the view of 
applicant(s) or other involved parties—in the violation of environmental law. The question is 
innate to environmental regulation, where often open-ended and general legal norms are 
concretized in scientifically detailed annexes or subordinate legislation.2 These characteristics 
of environmental regulation yield factual disputes, which bring to fore one of the key 
elements of judicial review: to which extent a court can evaluate administrative authorities’ 
stances on scientific questions pertinent to solving the substance matter.3 
Special needs that environmental judicial review entails have for long been 
recognized.4 The scientific expertise needed when adjudicating environmental matters has for 
example given grounds for establishing special environmental courts or tribunals (ECTs), 
because they are perceived as capable of offering a better platform for judges to thoroughly 
understand the matters with which they deal.5 The benefits are not necessarily restricted to 
having environmentally literate judges to begin with or allowing judges to specialize in 
environmental matters only, but also vesting them with adequate access to scientific expertise 
needed when adjudicating such cases. In-house technical experts develop the ECTs internal 
expertise on the matters they solve.6  
European countries are known for their reluctance towards establishing ECTs: this is 
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because the discipline of environmental law has been found to have limited independence to 
justify a special court; or because environmental protection is not in mentioned in many 
national constitutions, and the judicial system in general is preferred as intact.7 At the same 
time, the Member States of the European Union are bound, through Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the general principle of effective judicial protection, to ensure 
effective remedies when EU (enviromental) law is violated. The question which arises is, 
however, whether the current standard of review employed by the national competent courts 
and their possibility to access the necessary scientific expertise to solve the environmental 
disputes they are seized of, ensure effective protection of EU environmental law. 
This Special Issue explores several national perspectives on the standard of review, 
and access to scientific expertise in environmental judicial review before national courts. The 
examination is conducted in order to answer two overarching research questions: first, 
whether in the respective legal systems the EU principle of effective judicial protection is 
guaranteed, and second, whether the current differences in the law and the practice of the 
various legal systems might impair the uniform and effective enforcement of EU 
environmental law. At a practical level, it should stressed that the issue of access to scientific 
knowledge in environmental judicial review is closely linked to the standard (ie the intensity) 
of review which courts in environmental matters feel entitled or obliged to exercise. One 
might be inclined to think that the deeper the review of the facts and the scientific 
assessments made by the administration is in a certain legal system, the wider the powers of 
courts to avail themselves of help to understand those very facts and assessments. This 
Special Issue examines whether this assumption is correct and, specifically, the relation 
between the standard of review, the activity of investigation the courts exercise, and their 
access to scientific expertise when dealing with matters considered environmental. 
Due to the European context, in the limelight in this Special Issue are not the ECTs, 
but the general administrative courts that deal with environmental matters: in all the legal 
systems examined, environmental cases are taken to courts adjudicating a broad range of 
administrative matters. 8 However, even though not formally being ECTs, within some of 
these courts some modifications have been made for the environmental issues to secure 
sufficient access to scientific expertise—this is the case e.g. in Finland and in the 
Netherlands.9 A noteworthy exception to the European practice would be Sweden that has 
ECTs. Interestingly, due to historical reasons, Sweden’s manner of having of ‘in-house expert 
judges’ is in essence similar with that of Finland—thus scientific expertise is present in the 
court deliberations in both countries indistinguishably although the court systems differ.10   
By concentrating on the scientific knowledge in environmental judicial review, the 
topic at hand is one concrete example of the challenges that science and law interface yields. 
Relation between science and law has been widely examined in the policy context and from 
the legislator’s point of view.11 In this Special Issue we are not addressing that aspect in the 
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administrative legal systems nor the reality in courts when they are obliged to choose between 
diverse scientific knowledge that administrative authorities, operators, NGOs or other parties 
produce.12 In the national analyses, the focus is on whether the courts can, may, or must 
review the administration’s evaluation on the matter’s scientific aspects, and whether they 
have sufficient access to relevant expertise. The requirements that EU law sets for national 
procedural rules on this topic are also studied, as is the compatibility of the Member States’ 
solutions with them. 
In this foreword, the national solutions are summarized with an aim to explain the 
variations concerning the standard of review, activity or initiative in the inquiry the courts are 
entitled to take, and their possibilities to access to scientific expertise and knowledge. The EU 
requirements and national solutions are explained and contrasted in order to find out which of 
the solutions could be considered as compatible with Union law. Subsequently, these analyses 
will be complemented with an empirical perspective by discussing the results of a case study 
presented to four national judges. Finally, a conclusion will be reached on the two 
overarching research questions. 
 
2. A glance beyond the EU: India and Australia 
 
Before embarking onto the comparative analysis, a glimpse to the broader world 
seems to be in order. To this end, the examples of India and New South Wales are particularly 
relevant.  
India entertains a rather interesting solution in this regard with its National Green 
Tribunal (‘the NGT’). Having operated from 2011, the NGT is a relatively young institution 
and the process towards it exemplifies well the general reasons for initiating an ECT.13 Its 
scope of review is considered broad, being of ‘wide and overriding nature’, including 
questions of both facts and law, and the tribunal’s procedure is investigative and consultative. 
The NGT has also been granted right to work ex debito justitiae, illustrating well the 
environmental justice reason warranting the ECTs.14 The Indian Supreme Court and judiciary 
in general had an active role in instigating the NGT, as it had had earlier when dealing with 
environmental matters.15 Perhaps understandably for a system initiated with and representing 
judicial activism, the Indian NGT appears to have a broader scope of review and investigation 
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rights than any European jurisdiction examined in this Special Issue.  
The Australian endeavour to take the challenges posed by reviewing environmental 
decision-making earnestly is exemplified by the New South Wales’ ECT, the Land and 
Environment Court (NSWLEC). As is the case with the Indian NGT, the NSWLEC employs 
specific scientific or technical commissioners when deciding upon complex environmental 
matters. Experience from NSWLEC is in line with the other jurisdictions utilizing in-house 
expertise: their presence in the court may alleviate the bias produced by parties’ different 
ability to gain expertise to support their case.16 According to the experience from Sweden, in-
house experts can secure balancing the economic benefits of the planned project with its 
detrimental environmental impact in a correct manner.17 The relation of these aspects to trias 
politica, environmental justice or unbiased court procedure is further discussed in the 
conclusion of this foreword. 
 
2 European Requirements and National Approaches: Compatibility or Not?  
 
2.1. European Requirements 
 
The article by Eliantonio examines the EU legal requirements contained in secondary 
law and in the European courts’ case law concerning, firstly, the standard of review to which 
national courts must adhere to when deciding matters within the scope of EU law and, 
secondly, access to scientific knowledge in environmental litigation. The article shows that, 
on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, national courts are 
limited to an assessment of whether a ‘manifest error’ has been committed by the public 
authorities. Eliantonio also remarks that the Court of Justice never provided any guidance on 
the availability and type of expert knowledge that must be made available in national 
proceedings. However, as the ‘manifest error’ threshold entails checking the reliability and 
accuracy of the evidence presented before national courts, the latter have to be provided with 
adequate procedural means to access the scientific knowledge necessary to review the 
technical choices of the public authorities.   
Specifically concerning environmental law, Eliantonio also shows that there does not 
seem to be any explicit reference to neither in international nor in EU law on the requirements 
concerning the standard of review necessary in environmental matters or the access to the 
scientific knowledge of the judge. However, such requirements could perhaps be read in 
Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention that requires the possibility of a review of the ‘substantive 
and procedural legality’. 18 If a court or an impartial body has to review the substantive 
legality of an environmental decision, it has to be able to understand the scientific aspects and 
background of the decision. Similarly, the CJEU has recently stressed that national courts 
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have to be able to assess all aspects of the legality, and not only the procedural aspects, of the 
technical assessment (in the relevant cases, the environmental impact assessment) on which 
the challenged decisions were based.19 
Eliantonio concludes by touching upon the recent Commission Communication on 
Access to Justice, questioning in how far the vague requirements set therein ensure the 
realization of the principle of effective judicial protection. 
The conclusion arising from Eliantonio’s examination of the EU landscape, and the 
starting point for the comparative analysis, is that the legislative and jurisprudential 
framework does not set a clear standard and guidance for national courts. As a consequence, 
different national solutions on the applicable standard of review and access to scientific 
knowledge may all be acceptable under EU law––provided that the court is able to assess 
whether a ‘manifest error’ has been committed. After discussing the different national 
solutions, this foreword will move to tackling the two overarching research questions of this 
Special Issue, namely, firstly, whether there are any national solutions, which are below what 
is acceptable in terms of effective judicial protection and, secondly, whether the existence of 
(acceptable) different national solutions impair the uniform application of EU law. 
 
2.2 National Solutions 
 
The solutions in which the European legal systems have chosen to tackle the issue of 
access to scientific knowledge in environmental judicial review vary significantly. In some 
legal systems, courts play an active role to examine the technical aspects of a dispute and are 
allowed to ask for advice from technical experts. This is the case in Germany, for example, as 
is explained in Grashof’s article in this Special Issue. In other countries, courts partly consist 
of technical experts, which, at least to a certain extent, ensure that the courts understand the 
technical aspects they have to assess. This is the case for example in Finland and Sweden. 
The reformatory process (ie the possibility for courts to thoroughly review environmental 
decisions and to not only annul them, but also modify them) in both countries allows the 
administrative courts to review almost all aspects of the pending case, scientific review 
included in that assessment, as Kangasmaa and Paloniitty explain in their article. From this 
perspective, there seems to be a correlation between, on the one hand, the intensity of review 
of court and their possibility to access the necessary scientific knowledge. However, Grashof 
also points out to the practical difficulties connected to the active role which German 
administrative judges are expected to play: the need to assess that further investigations, 
requiring an expert, are necessary in the first place; how to interpret an expert report; and the 
judges’ attitude towards the expert opinion and the reasoning of the administrative decision. 
The Finnish solution of having in-house expert judges participating in court deliberations may 
circumvent these issues: their expertise can be fully employed through the process, lawyer 
and expert judges considering the case together. 
A different approach, which seems to be quite unique, is followed in the Netherlands. 
Courts may ask help from the ‘Foundation of Independent Court Experts in Environmental 
and Planning Law’ (Stichting Advisering Bestuursrechtspraak, StAB). This foundation 
employs some 40 technical experts whose task is to write reports about the technical aspects 
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of pending cases. Backes’ article discussed this unique body and concludes that the Dutch 
solution is a success story. 
As Germany, also Italian administrative courts have the possibility to access scientific 
knowledge through independent experts. However, as Caranta points out, unlike Germany, 
Italian courts are much more deferent towards the administrative authorities, although the last 
years have witnessed Italian courts deploying a somewhat more intense scrutiny. Much like a 
chicken and egg story, the consequence of this deferent attitude is that Italian administrative 
courts seldom avail themselves of expert witnesses, and this in turn keeps their review to the 
surface of the challenged administrative decision. 
While the German and Finnish scope of review can certainly be considered as going 
beyond the ‘manifest error’ threshold required by the case law of Court of Justice, and the 
courts’ attitude can also not be criticized with respect to compliance with the requirement of 
examining the ‘substantive and procedural legality’ of environmental decisions under the 
Aarhus Convention, the same conclusion is not obvious for the Italian legal system. Indeed, 
Caranta expresses doubts as to the compliance of the Italian legal system with the principle 
of effective judicial protection and the Aarhus Convention because of the often too marginal 
control performed by courts in environmental matters. The Italian situation presented by 
Caranta also shows that, while access to scientific knowledge might be provided in 
legislation, through, for example, the possibility to ask the report of an expert, great variations 
might still exist in the use which the courts make of this possibility in practice. 
If Italian courts have been depicted by Caranta as rather reluctant to review the 
complex technical choices made by the administration, and hence rarely using the possibility 
to ask an expert providing them with the necessary scientific knowledge to understand the 
technical aspects of a dispute, the article by Bar presents a picture of an even more deferent 
approach of national courts in Poland. Unlike the Italian situation, however, where the 
legislative framework does, in principle, provide for the possibility for courts to access the 
scientific knowledge necessary to assess the administration’s choices, Polish law strictly 
limits the same power. Indeed, as Bar explains, the review carried out by the administrative 
courts is based on the documents available in the file of the case and further evidence is 
generally not allowed. This, in turn, results in a very deferent attitude by the courts towards 
the authorities and a mere ‘formal’ control of environmental decisions, as shown by the case 
law presented by Bar and concerning the EIA Directive.20 In light of the complete bar from 
accessing scientific knowledge, coupled with a very marginal review of environmental 
decisions, Bar thus concludes that the Polish legal system is in breach of the principle of 
effective judicial protection and the requirements of the Aarhus Convention. 
Although not contained in this Special Issue, an important contribution to the topic 
under examination is offered by Ryall concerning the Irish situation.21 Ryall presents also a 
situation in which courts are very deferent towards the administrative and review decisions 
only against the threshold of ‘unreasonableness’: as Ryall puts it, ‘the court will not interfere 
with the exercise of discretion provided the decision-maker’s conclusion is not unreasonable 
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or irrational on the basis of the relevant material’.22 This intensity of review does not seem to 
allow for a substantive review of environmental decisions and, according to Ryall, might 
therefore fall foul of the EU principle of effective judicial protection and the Aarhus 
Convention. 
 Having presented the various national approaches towards the standard of review and 
the access to scientific knowledge in environmental judicial review, it is possible to tackle the 
two original research questions. The first question, namely whether there are national 
solutions which are in breach of EU law and the Aarhus Convention, can be therefore 
answered in the affirmative, rather certainly with regard to the Polish and Irish system, and 
quite possibly also with regard to the Italian system. It remains to be seen whether the matter 
will be brought at one point to the attention of the Court of Justice. 
The second research question, namely whether these national differences might 
impair the uniform application of EU law, can also be answered in the affirmative, because 
there is at least the potential for the same case to be solved differently. As the contributions to 
this Special Issue have shown, the standard of review in environmental decisions varies from 
a full review in Finland to a review limited to unreasonableness in Ireland: the same case, 
concerning the same violation of EU environmental law, might therefore be solved differently 
because judges will perform a different control of the factual basis on which the decision was 
grounded. Equally, if one court has no possibility to access the scientific knowledge 
necessary to understand and review the administration’s choices (as seems to be the case in 
Poland), it is likely to decide differently from a court where experts can be called or where 
scientific expertise is present within the court itself. Whether these interim conclusions can 
also hold true in practice will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 3.3 The Judges’ Perspective 
 
Administrative judges from four different legal orders within the EU—Germany, 
Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands—received case scenarios. Two situations were presented, 
aiming to discover similarities and differences in the use of scientific and technical 
knowledge by the different judges. The first case dealt with a permit procedure for a wind 
park that would affect species and habitats protected by the EU nature conservation 
legislation—a local NGO had voiced concerns that the competent authority’s decision did not 
pay due attention to endangered birds and bats. The second case was about an incineration 
plant with implications to the Best Available Technique conclusions under the Industrial 
Emissions Directive, with a neighbour complaining about the issued permit, and its 
consequences on health and nearby waters.23  
The judges’ discussion on the cases well illustrate the variations brought forth in the 
articles of this Special Issue, but also made visible some aspects absent from the doctrinal 
analysis. First and foremost, none of the judges found substantial relevance on whether the 
legislation in question was of national or EU origin. All the judges found their courts to be 
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open to any scientific evidence or ‘counter-investigation’ stemming from any source: the 
administrative authority, parties, NGOs, public concerned, etc. In Germany (as Grashof 
explains in her paper) and Sweden, the courts are obliged to conduct ex officio examination of 
the case; hence, according to the judges, if the information provided by the administration is 
not convincing for the court, the latter will further examine the question. In Italy, according to 
the participating judge, the courts do not favour the administrative authority’s stance on the 
scientific aspects as a matter of principle, but may in practice often be ‘cultural conformists’: 
as long as the authority shows to have sufficiently examined the case’s scientific side, the 
courts may de facto be reluctant to amend those stances.24 These few remarks show already 
that, in practice, the same case might well be adjudicated differently, as the same 
informational basis of a decision might be regarded sufficient by an Italian court and 
insufficient by a Swedish (or Finnish) court.  
Interesting differences were found when asked how certain legal-scientific concepts 
pertinent to the cases—such as ‘significant effect to the environment’, ‘favourable 
conservation status‘ or ‘best available technique’, are understood in the courts. The Swedish 
judge indicated that they are primarily taken as formal, i.e. legal, requirements, but to detail 
their content in an individual case a further non-legal analysis is necessitated, focusing on 
whether the investigation has been adequately thorough. There the in-house expert judges can 
aid in the evaluation.25 In Italy the concepts are also taken as legal ones, but the manner in 
which the scientific side is evaluated differs from the Swedish (or Finnish) situation, since the 
Italian courts need to manage without the in-house expert judges.26 In the Netherlands, the 
court can hear stances that such open-ended concepts have been imperfectly interpreted and if 
found necessary, according to the Dutch judge, it can ask for an expert opinion from the StaB. 
As regards to Germany, the judge’s answer was more structured. ‘Significant effect to the 
environment’ is a legal term; ‘favourable conservation status’ would be decided according to 
the nature protection agency’s evaluation on the matter; and ‘BAT’ is a question of fact, not 
law. There appears to be at least a weak link between the judges’ interpretation of the 
concepts on one hand, and the amount of scientific expertise at their disposal and their 
possibilities to employ it on the other: where scientific expertise is available, these concepts 
are not held to be entirely legal (Sweden), but if scientific knowledge is not readily available 
(at least not in the mind of the judges), the concepts may more easily be interpreted as strictly 
legal ones (Italy). These dissimilarities may again result in different solutions when deciding 
upon matters dealing with environmental regulation originated from EU, and in consequence 
jeopardize uniform application of EU law. 
In general, the judges’ answers confirm the results of the Special Issue articles: it is 
universally accepted that scientific knowledge is elementary for deciding upon environmental 
matters, but the ways in which judges discuss scientific questions varies: e.g. in Sweden they 
can be considered, in Germany to some extent and in Italy very little if at all. Not only 
constitutional solutions—in the understanding of trias politica—limit the courts’ 
investigation, but also cultural aspects and traditions may have their place, as is seen in the 
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Italian judge’s notion of judges being ‘cultural conformists’. If access to scientific expertise is 
well secured and the scope of court’s investigation allows for it, the courts may interpret a 
legal-scientific concept more thoroughly—allowing the scientific aspects to influence 
interpretation of legal norms—than is the case in jurisdictions with more narrowed down 
review and consequent access to scientific expertise.  
 
3 Conclusions: From Facts to Fairness 
 
It appears that, in environmental judicial review, factual and legal questions become 
entangled and some jurisdictions have allowed their court practices and procedures to reflect 
this reality. In the common law countries debate over the courts’ scope of review, whether it 
extends to questions of law, facts and/or merits, is coupled with conceptual and practical 
distinction between appeal and judicial review. 27  Interpretations of these concepts and 
variations of their practical results are abundant even to the extent of questioning whether a 
distinction between questions of law and other questions can be upheld at all. If not 
endorsing, the Special Issue articles at least elaborate on this argument when explaining the 
practical challenges this differentiation—or distinction, depending on the system—yield.28 
The Dutch and Finnish systems exemplify this well. In both countries, scientific expertise is 
available, but in the Netherlands (lawyer) judges need to formulate a question to the 
scientists, whereas in Finland the scientists are present in the court, being judges themselves. 
As explained in Backes’ article, at times the Dutch expert body rephrases the judges’ 
questions to better aid in solving the case, illustrating how knowledge of the factual side is 
imperative to properly understand the legal questions of the case. There may be a risk that 
legal systems’ reluctance to the use of scientific expertise produce rulings where also the legal 
question—and answer to it—is not as thoroughly considered as it could be, were the factual 
aspects more rigorously contemplated.  
Ultimately the factual disputes force us to face the democratic principle of 
distribution of powers: the articles in the Special Issue at hand reveal that interpretations of 
trias politica vary greatly between the countries even if they are part of the same transnational 
entity, the European Union, and bound by its requirements. In some of the studied 
jurisdictions, the review the courts perform may include also the factual or scientific aspects 
of the administrative authority’s decision, whilst in some such review is rather abhorred, 
regarded as excessive use of the judiciary’s powers at the expense of the executive’s. In the 
European Union, all these solutions should, however, meet the requirements the Union law 
establishes for adequate judicial review, and they should also secure the fulfilment of 
international obligations, especially the Aarhus Convention.  
Thus, what seemed like factual disputes boils down to a questions of fairness. When 
national solutions in Member States differ as greatly as they do, uniform implementation of 
EU law might be impaired, leading to potentially different treatment of cases dealing with 
                                                     
27 Hanna Wilberg and Mark Elliott, ‘Introduction’, 6–8, 15 in Hanna Wilberg and Elliott, Mark (eds.) The Scope 
and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Bloomsbury Publishing 2015).  
28 Hanna Wilberg ‘Deference on relevance and purpose?: Wrestling with the law/discretion divide’, 263,  in Hanna 
Wilberg and Elliott, Mark (eds.) The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow 
(Bloomsbury Publishing 2015). Of the jurisdictions examined in this Special Issue, for example, Poland has 
strongly separated questions of law from other questions, whereas in Finland and the Netherlands systemic 
solutions allow for a more lenient differentiation. In this regard Irish system seems to resemble the Polish one, as 
explained in Ryall (n 21). 
Union law depending on where they are dealt. In a field that demands specialization and 
expertise, also questions of fair trial emerge: do in-house expert judges or judges specialized 
in environmental cases endanger the impartiality of judges? 29  Then again, reaching 
environmental justice has been used as justification for the ECTs: the expertise concentrated 
in them might secure fairer solutions.30 The variations in national procedural solutions, court 
practices and even cultural conventions offer, in any case, much to ponder and study when 
uniform application of EU law in environmental matters or effectiveness of environmental 
regulation are in question.    
 
                                                     
29 As explained in Kangasmaa and Paloniitty in this Special Issue. 
30 See fn 4 and text at it. 
